The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ruled, in Caldwell, Jr. v. Jaurigue, that the boyfriend of the child’s deceased mother did not have an obligation to pay child support to the child’s father because the boyfriend did not have legal custody of the child. Eight years ago, in 2016, I wrote a blog regarding a case of first impression, at that time, wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in A.S. v. I.S., that when a stepparent takes affirmative legal steps to assume the same parental rights as a biological parent, the stepparent likewise assumes parental obligations, such as the payment of child support. The Caldwell decision serves to provide more guidance to attorneys and litigants and to clarify the application of the decision in A.S., as to when a parent may seek child support from a third party.
The facts in Caldwell are as follows: The biological parents of the child never married. Mother began a romantic relationship with Jaurigue while she was pregnant with the child. The child was born in March 2012 and in August 2013 mother and the child began living with Jaurigue. During this time, mother had primary physical custody of the child and father had partial physical custody. This continued for more than six years until Mother passed away in December 2019. The child then moved out of Jaurigue’s home and went to live with father. Jaurigue visited with the child only when the father allowed it and those occasions became rare.
In June 2020, Jaurigue filed a complaint in custody, alleging he stood in loco parentis1 to the child, in which he sought partial physical custody of the child. An order was entered in March of 2022 which granted father sole legal and primary physical custody of the child and Jaurigue partial physical custody.2 Jaurigue was awarded an extensive amount of physical custody as described by the Supreme Court, which included: one weekend every even numbered month; the second Saturday of odd-numbered months; the fourth Saturday of every month; every Thursday after school; Saturdays on weekends before the child’s birthday, Easter, Father’s Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas; one day during the child’s winter break; New Year’s Day; and one week of summer vacation. The custody order also allowed Jaurigue daily, private, fifteen-minute phone/FaceTime calls with the child on non-custodial days, and text message exchanges once per day. The custody order also required father to contact the child’s school to authorize Jaurigue as a person permitted to pick the child up on his custodial days; that he be permitted to be notified and participate in the child’s school events and extra-curricular activities; that Jaurigue be notified and allowed to participate in the child’s current and future counseling, therapy and tutoring.
Thereafter, and while father’s appeal of the custody order was pending, father filed a Complaint seeking child support from Jaurigue. Jaurigue filed preliminary objections to the support complaint based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, relying in part, on the A.S. decision. The trial court sustained Jaurigue’s preliminary objections and dismissed the support complaint. Father then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. A unanimous three judge panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the decision finding that while “in loco parentis status alone does not make a stepparent liable to financially support his stepchildren. …..there are some situations, such as the one in A.S. where a former stepparent affirmatively takes sufficient legal steps to act as a parent so as to trigger an obligation of support.” The Superior Court agreed with father that Jaurigue’s actions represented a proactive pursuit to assume parental duties of the child which would otherwise belong to father, which significantly intruded on father’s full custodial rights to the child.
Jaurigue filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was granted, in order to review the following question: “Does the Court’s holding in A.S. v. I.S., 130 A.3d 763 (Pa. 2015), extend beyond the facts of that case and create child support obligations in third parties who seek and obtain custody rights less than those of a biological parent?” In finding that Jaurigue had no duty to support the child, the Supreme Court held that Jaurigue was not a “parent” obligated to pay child support because he did not fit into the class of third parties obligated to pay support pursuant to the rule announced in A.S. as Jaurigue did not have legal custody of the child. He had partial physical custody only. Legal custody permits a party to make major decisions on behalf of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational decisions. By contrast, physical custody is the actual physical possession and control of a child. Partial physical custody is the right to assume physical custody of the child for less than the majority of the time. Unlike the stepfather in A.S., who had shared legal custody with mother, Jaurigue did not have any form of legal custody, as the father had sole legal custody. The Supreme Court went on to reason that since Jaurigue did not have any form of legal custody, he did not have any right to make major decisions on the child’s behalf and therefore, he was not a “parent” for purposes of the support statute. Under the support statute, child support obligations fall on parents only. The Court reasoned that “without the power to decide the monumental facets of a child’s life such as their medical treatment, religion, or course of education, the non-parent’s role is plainly subordinate to that of a parent.” The Court went on to explain that support obligations “may attach to individuals without a biological or adoptive parental tie in certain situations, but Jaurigue, who did not even have legal custody, does not fall into that category.” Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision imposing a support obligation on Jaurigue.
1 A party stands in loco parentis to a child when that party has assumed and discharged parental duties on behalf of a child.
2 Father appealed the custody order to the Superior Court challenging the trial’s court’s determination that Jarique stood in loco parentis to the child and therefor had standing to seek custody. The decision was affirmed on appeal, reasoning that father had waived his claims on account of his failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
